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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal raises a troublesome and recurring problem 
pertaining to the award of attorneys' fees and costs to a 
prevailing party under a federal statute and the duty of a 
district court in dealing with the prevailing party's petition 
for fees. Catherine M. Loughner ("Loughner") brought an 
action under, inter alia, the Fair Labor Standards Act 
("FLSA"), against The University of Pittsbur gh ("University") 
and the Presbyterian University Hospital ("Hospital"),1 for 
payment of unpaid wages and overtime compensation due 
her on the termination of her employment. Specifically, she 
claimed $3,169.28 in "base pay" unpaid wages and 
$25,218.06 in overtime pay pursuant to federal and 
Pennsylvania law. On the eve of trial the parties, stipulating 
that Loughner was the prevailing party, settled all claims, 
including overtime wages, liquidated damages, and interest, 
for $27,000. 
 
The District Court granted Loughner's counsel almost all 
of the hours and costs requested in his petitions, but at a 
lower hourly rate. In all, the Court reduced the amount of 
$118,725.00 claimed for attorneys' fees and awarded 
Loughner's counsel $88,655 in fees and $2,875.56 in costs. 
The Defendants timely appealed. We vacate the award and 
remand. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Together, the University and the Hospital will be referred to as 
"Defendants." 
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I. 
 
Loughner brought an action against the Defendants 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Pennsylvania Wage 
Payment and Collection Law, and the Pennsylvania 
Minimum Wage Act of 1968, for failure to pay her overtime 
wages. In a complaint replete with aver ments of, inter alia, 
racial discrimination, Loughner claimed only that she was 
entitled to certain base pay and overtime pay under an 
employment contract and under state and federal wage and 
hour laws. On the day before trial, December 6, 1999, the 
parties settled. 
 
Loughner's counsel, Michael E. Hoover ("Hoover"), filed a 
petition for attorneys' fees and costs, along with an affidavit 
concerning the reasonableness of the hours and hourly rate 
claimed. Hoover sought 474.9 hours at $250 per hour for 
his time, 2.2 hours at $60 per hour for a paralegal, and 
$2,782.74 in costs. Hoover performed all of the attorney's 
work on this case himself. He provided no separate cost 
assignment for his administrative, paralegal, and non-legal 
roles, instead charging a maximum rate for all of his tasks. 
 
The Hospital opposed Hoover's petition. The Hospital 
contended that Hoover presented no objective, admissible 
evidence of the prevailing market rate in the Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania area for work of a similar type. The Hospital 
also argued that Hoover failed to assign dif ferent hourly 
rates to various tasks he performed personally, from 
administrative to legal. The Hospital also complained about 
the excessive number of hours claimed in this r elatively 
simple "wage and hour" case. Concerning costs, the 
Hospital complained that Hoover neither supplied an 
explanation as to why they were incurred, nor supplied 
supporting documentation. 
 
Hoover, requesting an additional $3,300 in fees and 
$46.82 in costs, supplemented the petition without leave of 
court. Later, again without leave of court, Hoover filed 
affidavits from three attorneys 2 who attested to the 
reasonableness of the $250 hourly rate and the number of 
hours expended in Loughner's action. Hoover also sought to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. These attorneys were all employment discrimination practitioners. 
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discover the number of hours expended and hourly rates 
charged by defense counsel. 
 
The Hospital moved to strike the supplemental affidavits, 
but the District Court denied the motion. On February 11, 
2000, the District Court held a hearing at which it allowed 
Hoover to serve interrogatories on the Hospital concerning 
the hours expended in defending the action. The Hospital 
stated at the hearing that it did not keep separate records 
for the defense of this action because it accounted for and 
billed together the defense of all three of Loughner's actions.3 
The District Court acknowledged that this was defense 
counsel's position, and that Hoover could expect no answer 
to the interrogatories. See Appx. 219-220 ("Then say that. 
If you don't have separate billings just -- . . . tell him 
that."). 
 
After serving defense counsel with interrogatories, Hoover 
moved for sanctions for defense counsel's failur e to 
respond. Defense counsel reiterated that it did not possess 
separate records, and was unable to answer Loughner's 
interrogatories. The District Court later denied the motion 
for sanctions. 
 
Hoover filed a second supplement to the fee petition, 
requesting an additional $4,625 in fees and $46 in costs for 
time spent preparing the supplemental fee petitions, in 
obtaining affidavits from local attor neys concerning rates 
charged for similar actions, and in attending hearings. The 
Hospital opposed the second supplement for the same 
reasons asserted earlier, including that the hours and 
hourly rates were excessive. 
 
On April 14, 2000, the District Court granted Hoover's 
petitions, including an aggregate of 506.6 hours of 
attorney's time claimed, but the Court disallowed the 
paralegal time and reduced the hourly rate to $175 per 
hour. The Court ordered the Defendants to pay $88,655 in 
fees and $2,875.56 in costs. The extent of the District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Loughner filed separate civil rights and r etaliation actions against 
Defendants. These actions are still pending; they were not part of the 
settlement of this action. Defendants' counsel r epresents Defendants in 
all of Loughner's actions against them. 
 
                                4 
  
Court's evaluation on the record was the brief statement 
that: 
 
       I'll accept the number of hours you claim since[the 
       Defendants are] not able to come up with their own 
       number of hours to say, for instance, they spent only 
       half as many hours. 
 
       I've never had anybody ask for the number of hours a 
       Defendant has spent; but if you can't come up even 
       with a ballpark figure and say we only spent half as 
       many hours as he spent, I have to suggest that -- 
       rather, infer that the Defendant spent a lot of hours 
       also; and I'm inclined to accept the number of hours 
       claimed by the Plaintiff, that's all, and I'll decide the 
       matter. 
 
There is no evidence that the District Court evaluated 
further the number of hours awarded. In lowering the 
hourly rate from $250 per hour to $175 per hour , the Court 
reasoned that "the practice of employment discrimination 
law . . . is much more complex than a wage and overtime 
case." The Court also noted that Hoover "has not attempted 
to adjust his hourly rate depending on the type of work he 
was performing." The Court was "satisfied that plaintiff . . . 
adequately set forth the costs incurred in pr osecuting this 
action." 
 
Loughner appealed concerning the hourly rate r eduction; 
Defendants appealed concerning the number of hours and 
costs awarded. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court had federal question jurisdiction. See 
28 U.S.C. S 1331. The District Court's entry of an order 
directing payment of attorneys' fees and costs is a final 
order. We have appellate jurisdiction of the timely notices of 
appeal. See 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
We review de novo the standards and procedures applied 
by the District Court in determining attor neys' fees, as it is 
a purely legal question. See Smith v. Philadelphia Parking 
Auth., 107 F.3d 223, 225 (3d Cir. 1997). However, the 
reasonableness of an award of attor neys' fees is reviewed 
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for abuse of discretion. See Washington v. Philadelphia 
County Ct. of Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 1034-35 (3d 
Cir. 1996). The District Court's findings of fact are subject 
to "clearly erroneous" review. See id. at 1039. A fee award 
"is within the district court's discretion so long as it 
employs correct standards and procedures and makes 
findings of fact not clearly erroneous." Pennsylvania 
Environ. Def. v. Canon-McMillan, 152 F .3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 
1998) (internal quotation omitted). 
 
The award of attorneys' fees in this case is authorized 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, which pr ovides "a 
reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the Defendant, and 
costs of the action" to a prevailing plaintiff. See 29 U.S.C. 
S 216(b). In cases like this, we use the "lodestar" formula, 
which requires multiplying the number of hours reasonably 
expended by a reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley v. 
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983); Pennsylvania v. Delaware 
Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986); 
Pennsylvania Environ. Def., 152 F .3d at 232. "When the 
applicant for a fee has carried his burden of showing that 
the claimed rates and number of hours are r easonable, the 
resulting product is presumed to be the reasonable fee to 
which counsel is entitled." Delaware V alley Citizens' 
Council, 478 U.S. at 564 (internal quotation omitted). 
 
The District Court must articulate the basis for a fee 
award. See Pennsylvania Environ. Def., 152 F.3d at 232 
("the district court must `provide a concise but clear 
explanation of its reasons for [a] fee award.' "). Even though 
"a district court's findings, when adopted verbatim from a 
party's proposed findings, do not demand mor e stringent 
scrutiny on appeal," Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. 
Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209 (3d Cir . 1993), the record must 
reflect, at least, that the trial court "fully comprehended the 
factual and legal issues and adequately perfor med the 
decision reaching process." Pennsylvania Environ. Def., 152 
F.3d at 233. We have difficulty ef fectively reviewing a grant 
of attorneys' fees for abuse of discretion without findings of 
fact and a clear explanation of the reasons a District Court 
granted the fee, especially when, as here, the award is more 
than triple the amount of both the overtime claimed in the 
complaint, and the amount for which the plaintif f settled. 
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A. Time Charged 
 
This court has held that in calculating the hours 
reasonably expended, the District Court "should review the 
time charged, decide whether the hours set out were 
reasonably expended for each of the particular purposes 
described and then exclude those that are `excessive, 
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.' " Public Int. Research 
Group of N.J., Inc. v. Windall, 51 F .3d 1179, 1188 (3d Cir. 
1995) (internal citation omitted); see also Rode v. 
Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990) ("The 
district court should exclude hours that are not reasonably 
expended."). Thus, the District Court has a positive and 
affirmative function in the fee fixing pr ocess, not merely a 
passive role. It should reduce the hours claimed by the 
number of hours spent litigating claims on which the party 
did not succeed, that were distinct from the claims on 
which the party did succeed, and for which the fee petition 
inadequately documents the hours claimed. See id. The 
party opposing the fee award has the bur den to challenge 
"by affidavit or brief with sufficient specificity to give fee 
applicants notice, the reasonableness of the r equested fee." 
Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d at 1183. However, "[t]he district 
court cannot `decrease a fee award based on factors not 
raised at all by the adverse party.' " Id.  
 
Defendants argue that the District Court's failure to 
conduct any analysis of the claimed number of hours 
constitutes reversible error to the extent it shifted the 
burden of proof of the reasonableness of the request from 
Loughner onto them. Defendants maintain that it was 
unreasonable for the District Court to accept"wholesale" all 
of the hours Hoover claimed. See App. Br . at 25. 
Defendants also argue that the District Court granted 
Hoover's request for the inappropriate r eason that they 
were unable to provide a precise allocation of the hours 
spent defending the action, and that such a rationale would 
convert the fee award into a sanction. Defendants further 
argue that Hoover's request was unr easonable per se when 
measured against the standards of amount of success and 
billing judgment. Hoover claims to have expended 506 
attorney hours on a case presenting "narrow" issues which 
never went to trial. See App. Br. at 30. 
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Regrettably, the District Court articulated nofindings in 
the record supporting its award. The memorandum 
accompanying the award order simply states"the court 
conclude[s] that, based on Defendants' failur e to even 
attempt to estimate the number of hours and costs 
expended in defending this action, the court would accept 
the number of hours claimed by plaintiff 's counsel as 
reasonable." The Court does not explain how defense 
counsel's inability or failure to provide the hours they 
charged on this case, alone, supports the conclusion that 
506 attorney hours is reasonable to settle, without trial, a 
simple wage and hour case.4 The District Court had earlier 
commented that it did not "know . . . the r elevance of [the 
amount of time spent by the defense in this case]." Yet the 
Court based the award solely on the Defendants' failure to 
respond to the interrogatories inquiring about the amount 
of time spent by defense counsel in this case. The District 
Court performed scant analysis, if any, of the hours in 
Hoover's petition. It provides us no findings-- not even a 
comment -- on the reasonableness of a claim of over 120 
hours for communications between the plaintif f and her 
lawyer. We have no basis for deter mining the 
reasonableness or accuracy of many char ges that combine 
hours for several tasks. The District Court's draconic 
explanation offers no basis for review. 
 
Hoover argues that the Defendants failed to raise and 
support their objections, as was their burden. He argues 
that the 25-page petition for attorneys' fees itemized the 
work performed, dates, and amounts of time; that plaintiff 
met her burden of production, and that the burden shifted 
to Defendants to disprove the reasonableness of her 
petition. No such rigid burden shifting is established in our 
cases. The Defendants raised substantive objections to the 
reasonableness of Hoover's fee petition. The Court, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We can infer the District Court meant that if Defendant's counsel 
spent many hours on this action defending unr easonable claims, this 
could constitute evidence that plaintiff 's counsel expended a reasonable 
time on plaintiff 's claims. This is a non sequitur. We are uncertain 
whether this was the District Court's rationale, and we are equally 
uncertain how this premise leads to the conclusion that plaintiff 's 
petition must be reasonable. 
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therefore, had an obligation to evaluate the petition in light 
of the objections, and to explain why it accepted carte 
blanche the plaintiff 's claim for time expended and rejected 
the Defendants' objections. 
 
Hoover makes an emotional appeal that we appr ove the 
high number of hours claimed in his petition, alleging that 
the Defendants were engaged in "trench warfare." However, 
the District Court did not make a finding that this 
otherwise straightforward wage and hour case was 
complicated by Defendants' conduct and we see nothing in 
this record to support one.5  
 
Accordingly, we are constrained to conclude that the 
District Court erred by failing to perfor m a sufficient 
analysis of Hoover's petition in light of Defendants' 
objections and the decisions of this Court. Ther efore, we 
will remand for an analysis and findings concerning the 
reasonableness of the hours claimed in the fee petitions 
with the supplements thereto. 
 
B. Hourly Rate of Attorney Compensation  
 
Hoover argues on cross-appeal that the District Court 
inappropriately reduced the hourly rate claimed. Generally, 
a reasonable hourly rate is calculated accor ding to the 
prevailing market rates in the relevant community. See 
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984); Dellarciprete, 
892 F.2d at 1183. The court "should assess the experience 
and skill of the prevailing party's attor neys and compare 
their rates to the rates prevailing in the community for 
similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, 
experience, and reputation." Dellar ciprete, 892 F.2d at 
1183. The prevailing party "bears the bur den of 
establishing by way of satisfactory evidence, `in addition to 
[the] attorney's own affidavits,' . . . that the requested 
hourly rates meet this standard." W ashington v. 
Philadelphia Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 89 F .3d 1031, 1035 
(3d Cir. 1996) (citing Blum v. Stenson , 465 U.S. 886, 895 
n.11 (1984)). The starting point in ascertaining a 
reasonable hourly rate "is the attor ney's usual billing rate, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The District Court implied, and we believe, that in general, a wage and 
overtime case is an uncomplicated cause of action. 
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but this is not dispositive." Public Inter est Group, 51 F.3d at 
1185. 
 
The District Court held that $250 was excessive based on 
the type of claims asserted in this action. The Court was 
not persuaded by the three affidavits submitted by 
employment discrimination practitioners because it felt that 
an employment discrimination case is "much mor e complex 
than a wage and overtime case." The District Court also 
noted that Hoover did not adjust his hourly rate depending 
on the type of work he performed.6 Therefore, the District 
Court awarded a flat $175 hourly rate to all of Hoover's 
awarded hours. 
 
Having rejected the prevailing party's evidence of rates, 
the District Court was free to affix an adjusted rate. 
However, the Court did not explain sufficiently how it 
reached $175 per hour for all hours worked. The Court 
acknowledged that Hoover performed nearly all of the work 
on this case by himself, and that Hoover claimed his 
highest billable rate for all work perfor med. A claim by a 
lawyer for maximum rates for telephone calls with a client, 
legal research, a letter concerning a discovery request, the 
drafting of a brief, and trial time in court is neither fair nor 
reasonable. Many of these tasks are ef fectively performed 
by administrative assistants, paralegals, or secr etaries. As 
such, to claim the same high reimbursement rate for the 
wide range of tasks performed is unr easonable. Having 
prevailed in the litigation is not cause to overwhelm the 
losing party with unreasonable fees and costs."Hours that 
would not generally be billed to one's own client ar e not 
properly billed to an adversary." Public Interest Group, 51 
F.3d at 1188. 
 
We see no error of the District Court in reducing Hoover's 
hourly rate. However, it failed to reach a reasonable rate for 
the separate tasks performed. Deter mination of the hourly 
rate for legal services in the applicable marketplace is a 
finding of fact; it can be reversed if clearly erroneous. See 
Public Interest Group of N.J. v. W indall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1188 
n.12 (3d Cir. 1995). We conclude that on its face, $175 per 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. This would have been a valid basis for adjusting the hours claimed as 
well. 
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hour is an unreasonable award for the wide range of tasks 
performed by Hoover. The District Court should reach a 
reasoned conclusion as to the prevailing market rate for the 
type of tasks delineated in Hoover's petition. 
 
C. Costs 
 
Hoover submitted a detailed breakdown of costs incurred, 
as well as an Affidavit as to the necessity and 
reasonableness of the costs. The Hospital objected to all of 
the claimed costs for lack of evidence supporting the 
reasonableness and necessity of the expenses. The extent of 
the District Court's analysis on the costs issue was a 
statement that "[a]fter consideration, the court is satisfied 
that plaintiff has adequately set forth the costs incurred in 
prosecuting this action, and, therefor e, plaintiff will be 
awarded costs in the amount of $2,875.56." 
 
Attorneys' fees and costs are frequently analyzed 
together, so the same standards apply to our review of costs 
as to our review of attorneys' fees. A fee petition must "be 
specific enough to allow the district court to determine if 
the hours claimed are unreasonable for the work 
performed." Washington v. Philadelphia Cty. Ct. of Common 
Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 1037 (3d Cir . 1996) (internal citations 
omitted). In this case, the record contains a one-page 
statement of costs, and an Affidavit swearing to their 
accuracy. The one-page statement contains dates and 
descriptions, but does not include supporting data 
explaining the relevant purpose of the expenditures. 
Counsel failed to provide the District Court with any 
reasonable basis justifying the expenditur es in this case. 
There is no evidence in the record under which we can 
evaluate whether the District Court abused its discr etion in 
allowing the claim for costs. 
 
III. 
 
The award of the District Court will be vacated, and the 
case remanded to the District Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. Costs taxed against Catherine 
M. Loughner as appellant/cross-appellee. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, Concurring and Dissenting. 
 
Although I agree with the Majority's analysis and 
conclusions concerning the hourly rate, I would also affirm 
the District Court with respect to the number of hours 
worked and the costs expended. Loughner's attor ney 
submitted twenty-five pages of itemized recor ds specifying 
the date when the work was performed, the attorney or 
paralegal involved, the details of the assignment, the 
amount of time spent, and the hourly rate char ged. This 
documentation provides a sufficient basis upon which to 
make an award. The Hospital opposed Loughner's fee 
petition by simply asserting that the amounts sought were 
"unreasonable and excessive given the uncomplicated 
nature of [Loughner's] wage and overtime claims." In 
response to the Hospital's position, Loughner's counsel filed 
a motion to compel production of documents indicating the 
number of hours expended by defense counsel on this case. 
The District Court directed Loughner to serve 
interrogatories on the Hospital to enable her to obtain the 
information. As directed, Loughner's counsel served the 
Hospital with four interrogatories regar ding the number of 
hours it expended, its hourly rates, and the costs incurred 
in defending this action. The Hospital failed to comply and 
instead objected to each interrogatory. 
 
After receiving the Hospital's objections, Loughner's 
counsel filed a motion for sanctions. As the Majority notes, 
the Defendants contended that they could not r espond 
because they had consolidated the accounting and billing 
for all three of Loughner's actions. The District Court Judge 
found this response unacceptable: "I'm going to tell you 
that really surprises me. I was in a law fir m for 23 years, 
and I worked for the same client on a number of dif ferent 
matters, and I could--you always knew how many hours 
you spent on each matter . . . . This was a claim for fair 
labor -- this is a claim for -- under the -- completely 
different from some of the others, just a back pay matter." 
J.A. at 264-65. Based on the non-responsiveness of defense 
counsel, the Judge concluded "[b]ut if you can't come up 
even with a ballpark figure and say we only spend half as 
many hours as he spent, I have to suggest that -- rather, 
infer that the Defendant spent a lot of hours also; and I'm 
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inclined to accept the number of hours claimed by the 
Plaintiff . . . ." Id. at 268. This is not unlike the summary 
judgment context, in which a party cannot simply r ely on 
bare allegations or denials. Thus, in the absence of any 
evidence to the contrary of what she submitted, the Judge 
concluded that Loughner's hours were reasonable. I think 
this action falls well within the District Court's considerable 
discretion. 
 
The Majority argues that the District Court failed to 
review whether Loughner's hours were r easonable. I 
disagree. As indicated above, Judge Standish attempted to 
gather data in order to assess the reasonableness of the 
numbers of hours allegedly expended by Loughner's 
counsel. However, the Defendants refused to cooperate. 
They failed even to attempt to calculate the number of 
hours they spent on the instant matter, even when directed 
by the Court to do so. Regardless of the Defendants' billing 
system, they cannot simply thumb their nose at the Court's 
request. When they refused, the District Court merely 
accepted and deemed admitted the allegations of the 
Plaintiff. The District Court is accor ded wide and 
considerable discretion in awarding fees. It is in the best 
position to know the complexity of the issues pr esented, 
and the nature and quality of the work per formed by the 
attorneys. Accordingly, I would defer to the District Court's 
finding and affirm.1 
 
Defense counsel's conduct throughout the litigation also 
supports the District Court's finding. Loughner's counsel 
alleged, and the District Court obviously agr eed, that the 
number of hours he expended in this case was a dir ect and 
proximate result of the "trench warfare" employed by the 
Defendants. It seems that defense counsel played a game of 
delay and deter. For example, the Defendants failed to allow 
discovery, which necessitated motions to compel and 
motions for sanctions. They unsuccessfully appealed every 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. I disagree emphatically with the majority's characterization of the 
District Court Judge's explanations as "Draconic." Maj. Op. at 8. I doubt 
that either a dragon or the infamous lawgiver of Athens would be 
comfortable in the presence of the esteemed, learned, and gentle Judge 
who presided over this matter. 
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report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. They 
opposed every procedural motion filed by Loughner, even 
the most routine. Their flurry of motions, including those to 
dismiss and for summary judgment, also added to the fee 
obligations of Loughner. During the hearing in which 
Loughner sought to compel documents evidencing the 
number of hours expended by defense counsel, her counsel 
explained: 
 
       I think that what we're saying is plaintif f 's counsel just 
       stood toe-to-toe with the defense in this case. A lot of 
       the hours that were expended here, as Mr . Hoover's 
       time records show, were related to struggles over 
       discovery and production of documents and so forth. 
       Some of that wound up before magistrate Judge 
       Sensenich. Judge Sensenich offered sanctions in this 
       case. Mr. Hoover said no, that's fine. W e'll proceed if we 
       can just get the information. 
 
Id. at 218. The Court merely responded to this conduct. 
 
In response to the "trench warfar e" of the Defendants, 
Loughner sought discovery of the number of hours 
expended by defense counsel. When the Defendants r efused 
to provide answers, the District Court dir ected Loughner's 
counsel to submit interrogatories to defense counsel. In 
spite of the court order, the Defendants refused to answer 
the interrogatories; thus Loughner was for ced to file a 
motion for sanctions. The Court thereafter found that 
Loughner had met her burden as to the number of hours 
expended. 
 
Defense counsel's failure to respond constituted a waiver 
of its right to challenge the content of Loughner's affidavits 
concerning the number of hours spent. And, I believe that 
the District Court's conclusion that Loughner sustained her 
burden as to the reasonableness of the number of hours 
expended by her counsel is eminently reasonable. The 
District Court apparently believed Loughner and 
compensated her attorney for the expensive game of legal 
"chicken" that he was forced to play by Defendant's 
attorneys. In my view, these findings do not constitute an 
abuse of discretion. 
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With respect to Loughner's counsel's r equest for 
reimbursement of costs in the amount of $2,875.56, the 
Defendants argued that the request should be denied in its 
entirety due to a lack of documentation. However, 
Loughner's counsel submitted a detailed breakdown of the 
requested costs and an affidavit as to their reasonableness. 
Thus, the District Court found that Loughner pr esented an 
adequate justification for the costs incurr ed in prosecuting 
this action. Given the wide latitude of the District Court in 
this area, I would affirm the awar d of costs. 
 
Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
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